What Is Goodness Good For? by Piller, Christian Johannes
8 What Is Goodness Good For?
Christian Piller
The main concern of this chapter is to understand the relationship 
between being good on the one hand and being good for someone (or 
something) on the other. If I were asked what is good, I’d say a warm 
blanket on a cold evening, a friendly smile when one wouldn’t expect 
one, a corkscrew when one is needed. Of course there is more: being 
able to do things and to do them well, a good job, a family, world peace, 
a cure for cancer, for depression, and for laziness. If I were asked what 
is good for me and others, I’d list pretty much the same things. It will 
come as no surprise that goodness, in many of its uses, and goodness 
for someone are related.
The idea that goodness-for is, in a sense yet to be specified, the 
basic notion is philosophically attractive for two reasons. First, it 
would provide a basis for moral and practical thought which escapes 
various forms of scepticism directed at goodness. For example, some 
philosophers think that accepting goodness is akin to accepting 
‘hurrahness’. Nothing, however, is ‘hurrah’ and the sceptic assigns 
goodness the same fate: it is revealed as a device which projects onto 
the world what is a matter of one’s sentiments. Contrast goodness-
for. If welcome news comes my way, I might well say ‘Hurrah’. 
Nevertheless, goodness-for facts are not exhausted by ‘hurrah’ reac-
tions. Goodness-for-me is an instance of the more general notion of 
being good for something and no one needs to react positively to 
all instances of something’s being good for something else. Regular 
maintenance is good for a machine, whatever your attitude to this 
machine might be. Making goodness-for the basic notion thus prom-
ises to free us from metaphysical and epistemological worries about 
goodness.
Secondly, when we think about matters of morality and polit-
ics, goodness-for focuses our concern on what is essential to such 
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thinking, namely a concern for what is good for people, i.e. a con-
cern for preventing harm to them and, in general, for improving the 
conditions of human life. Goodness-for is a central notion whose 
importance cannot be denied. Once we have focused our attention 
on goodness-for, what room is left for goodness? What is goodness 
simpliciter good for?
Friends of goodness might turn to Plato, who says that ‘the great-
est thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just 
things and all the rest become useful and beneficial’ (Plato, Republic 
6.505b). According to this Platonic picture, which influenced much 
of twentieth-century philosophy via G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, 
the idea of the good is central to morality and politics. This is not to 
deny the importance of goodness-for. If Plato is right, we need the 
notion of goodness simpliciter in order to understand the useful and 
the beneficial. This provides an entry to the debate in this chapter. 
Is something good for me because it is good or is the fact that some-
thing is good explained by its being good for (many or most) people? 
The debate is shaped by opposing views about what explains what 
and which notion, if any, can claim priority.1
In this chapter I will explore the idea that goodness-for is more 
basic than goodness. I don’t have a compelling positive argument in 
favour of this view. I will try to make it plausible indirectly by reject-
ing criticisms of the priority of goodness-for thesis in the second part 
of the chapter. In the first part, I will explain the priority of good-
ness-for view by contrasting it with other views; I will say more about 
what kind of priority I have in mind, and I will motivate the view.
1 In addition to the priority of goodness-for, which is the thesis I will argue for, and its 
opposite, the priority of goodness, there is a further view, which we can call the independ-
ence view. According to the independence view, ethics deals with two independent notions 
neither of which is prior. See e.g. Parfit (2011: 41), who distinguishes ‘good for someone’ in 
the reason-implying sense from ‘good’ in the impartial reason-implying sense. For Parfit, 
when it comes to ‘the most important uses of “good” and “bad” ’ (39), there is no distance 
between goodness and goodness-for on the one side and reasons on the other. These evalu-
ative notions are distinguished in normative terms. Goodness-for provides personal self-
interested reasons, goodness provides reasons for anyone. In contrast to Parfit, I do not want 
to commit myself at this stage to any claims about reasons.
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1. Explaining the Priority of Goodness-For
The No-Goodness View
Goodness-for would by default be the basic evaluative concept if 
there were no meaningful notion of goodness simpliciter. If we were 
non-cognitivists about goodness, whilst exempting goodness-for, the 
debate would be won before it got started. Non-cognitivism is not the 
only semantic challenge which would speak in favour of the priority of 
goodness-for by default.
Peter Geach has famously argued that ‘There is no such thing as 
being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so’ 
(Geach 1956: 34). There are good cars, good poker players, and good 
strawberries (and so on), but there is no property of goodness which 
cars, poker players, and strawberries would have in common. ‘Good’, 
according to this view, is logically attributive; the properties it picks out 
vary depending on the kind of thing which is said to be good. Being 
attributive, we can neither infer that something is good from some-
thing’s being a good so-and-so nor will ‘good’ travel across different 
sortals. A poker player is a human being; a good poker player need not 
be a good human being.
Judy Thomson has pressed this point against the Moorean view that 
goodness is a detachable property since the early 1990s (Thomson 1991, 
1994, 1996, 1997, 2008). Looking back at her latest book (2008) she 
writes:
I said in  chapter 1 that there is no such property as goodness. And I said that 
people who say the words ‘A is good’ are not all asserting one and the same 
proposition, namely the proposition that is true just in case A has the property 
goodness; there being no such property as goodness, there is no such propo-
sition. Rather, people who say the words ‘A is good’ are asserting different 
propositions—such as that A is a good toaster, that A is a good tennis player, 
and that A is good at doing crossword puzzles. (2008: 236)
Geach’s point, important as it is, has its limitations. A good car is good 
as a car but good weather is not good as weather. In fact ‘being good 
as weather’ does not seem to make much sense. Good weather means 
sunshine, warmth, a light breeze maybe. It is weather which people 
typically enjoy. Good weather is weather good for people. (The farmer 
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whose crops depend on rain would certainly welcome rain but looking 
at the dark clouds it would be a deviation from standard usage if he 
said ‘Looks like it’s going to be a nice day’.) In general, on a grammati-
cal level, goodness-for sentences do not fit well with the idea that all 
goodness-talk is using ‘good’ attributively.2
On a philosophical level, however, the priority of goodness-for over 
goodness is not threatened by attributive goodness.3 One could criticize 
a theory built on goodness from both angles. I focus on goodness-for 
because many instances of attributive goodness can be explained in 
terms of being good for us. Geach and Thomson are certainly right that 
good cars and good strawberries do not share any relevant first-order 
properties. Nevertheless, in both cases there is a clear relation to human 
interests. A good car is a car that satisfies the car-related interests of 
people who want or need cars; the same holds for a good strawberry.
In general, being a good K is such that it satisfies the interest of people 
who want or need Ks. In this way, there is a property, a second-order 
property, which good cars and good strawberries have in common after 
all. They have the property that their first-order properties are such 
that they satisfy the interest of those interested in Ks. In good-for talk 
we can say that good Ks are good for those who are interested in Ks(in 
2 Thomson’s earlier work had more distance from Geach’s thesis. Her view then was that 
all goodness is goodness in a way. She distinguished between four main categories of being 
good in a way: the useful, the enjoyable, the skilful, and the beneficial. A similar project 
has been pursued by G. H. von Wright in his The Variety of Goodness (1963). Thomson had 
applied her criticism—to be good is to be good in a certain way—not only to Moorean 
goodness but to the attributive use of ‘good’ as well and, thus, also to Geach’s thesis. ‘What 
do you mean’, she asks, ‘by claiming that this is a good book? Do you mean it’s good to read, 
or good to look at, or good to use as a paperweight? In general, there has to be a context 
that tells us what a speaker means by “That’s a good K” or we simply do not know, for the 
expression “good K” leaves this open’ (1997: 278). I feel Thomson is overly critical at this 
point. Geach’s idea was that our understanding of what it is to be a K can provide us with 
an account of what it is to be a good K. Especially in case of artefacts this is very plausible. 
When challenged whether a good book is good to read or good to look at or good as a paper-
weight, there is an obvious reply. Books are not pictures; they are things to be read, so if 
there were no point in reading it, it would not be a good book. I have discussed Thomson’s 
earlier view in more detail in Piller (2001).
3 Often the debate is about goodness simpliciter or unqualified goodness versus qualified 
goodness with both attributive goodness and goodness-for being part of the latter group; 
see e.g. Kraut (2011). However, the logic of attributive goodness and that of the relation of 
being-good-for are quite different, and arguments valid for one notion have no role to play 
in regard to the other notion. Thomson (2008) focuses on attributive goodness; I focus on 
goodness-for.
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terms of their being interested in them). Being interested in K is dif-
ferent from being interested in K* even if all Ks are K*s. An interest 
in cars is ill described as an interest in coloured objects, although cars 
are coloured objects. Attributive goodness does not travel across sortals 
because the second-order property it refers to is fixed by interests which 
are essentially K related.
Some philosophers think that there is no such property as being 
good. If they are right, the notion of goodness-for will have a kind of 
default priority. The priority view defended here does not rely on such a 
semantic challenge to goodness.
Normative Motivation
Why should we be interested in the priority of goodness-for? Even if 
the battle could be won on metaphysical grounds, the main motivation 
for the priority thesis is normative. The task is to capture good practi-
cal thought. As a defender of the priority of goodness-for I claim that 
thinking about what to do in terms of goodness leads practical thought 
astray. A defender of goodness will want to say the opposite: good prac-
tical thought needs goodness. I will come to this view later on when 
I  consider objections to the priority of the goodness-for view. First, 
I want to look at the normative case in its favour.
In his paper ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ John Taurek (1977) 
argues for a negative and a positive thesis. The negative claim is that 
the number of people affected by some harm or benefit is not in itself 
morally relevant. The positive claim is that in cases in which we can 
help one of two non-overlapping groups of people, but we cannot help 
both, we should choose by randomization. According to this positive 
thesis, respect and fairness require that everyone gets an equal chance 
of being benefitted.4
When one can either save one person from some harm or a group 
of five persons, and one cannot save all six people, what supports the 
idea that we should save the bigger number? If the harm is death, we 
can argue as follows. Human life is valuable; the more people we save, 
the more of what is of value is being preserved. We should save the five 
4 Although I disagree with Taurek about his normative conclusion, I think there is some-
thing true about both his negative and his positive thesis; for a position which, in this 
respect, is similar, though different in others, see Broome (1984).
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and let the one die because, if we did not do so, matters would be even 
worse.
At first sight this is not a bad answer. Isn’t it common ground that 
human life is valuable? If it is a good answer, it should persuade every-
one, including the one who cannot be saved. Taurek asks us to imagine 
how the one would respond. According to Taurek (cf. 1977: 299), he 
would respond as follows. ‘What do you mean when you say that it 
would be worse if the many died than if I died? It would be worse for 
me if you saved them and it would be worse for each of them if you saved 
me. That’s all there is to it.’
The question of the one is legitimate: what do you mean by ‘worse’? 
There is more to Taurek’s challenge than just this question. Relevant 
evaluations, it is suggested, must tell us for whom something is good or 
better or worse. Such goodness-for evaluations are points to start from. 
If goodness-for points in different directions, there is no resolution of 
this conflict by any simple appeal to goodness.
Assume, just for the moment, that hedonism is the correct way to 
give content to the idea that life is valuable. You would save the many 
because thereby you would ensure that there is more pleasure in the 
world. You’d say to the one, ‘I can’t save you because if you live less 
pleasure will be created than by the lives of the five.’ Imagine saying this 
to the one. Can anyone really think that the one has now been given a 
reason he can understand and accept? Wouldn’t he respond as follows, 
‘For me my pleasure is important; for them their pleasure is important. 
For whom should it be important that there is more pleasure in the 
world?’ Trying to convince the one in this way would be, in Taurek’s 
words (1977: 299) ‘comical if it were not so outrageous’.
The failure of such a justification has nothing to do with the implau-
sible narrowness of hedonism. Add to pleasure the pursuit of valuable 
projects which are said to provide our lives with meaning and signifi-
cance. What sort of projects? Not everyone is involved in finding a cure 
for cancer or in rocket science. People want to get better at cooking or 
chess; they might want to appreciate the high arts, maybe philosophy 
as well, learn a language and things like that. The fact that more such 
projects will be pursued will be as bad a justification as the hedonistic 
one. The one will say, ‘Are you serious? You don’t save me because if you 
did, fewer nice meals would be cooked and fewer people would struggle 
with foreign languages and high mountains?’
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Taurek captures his view in a slogan: it’s not the loss of the individual 
but the loss to the person which counts.
My concern for what happens to them is grounded chiefly in the realization 
that each of them is, as I would be in his place, terribly concerned about what 
happens to him. It is not my way to think of them as each having a certain 
objective value, determined however it is we determine the objective value 
of things, and then to make some estimate of the combined value of the five 
against the one. If it were not for the fact that these objects were creatures 
much like me, for whom what happens to them is of great importance, I doubt 
that I would take much interest in their preservation. As merely intact objects 
they would mean very little to me, being, as such, nearly as common as toad-
stools. The loss of an arm of the Pietà means something to me not because the 
Pietà will miss it. But the loss of an arm of a creature like me means something 
to me only because I know he will miss it, just as I would miss mine. It is the 
loss to this person that I focus on. (Taurek 1977: 306–7)
Grief has two sides. There is the loss of a friend; this matters to us 
because of what it deprives us. There is the loss to the friend, what he 
has been deprived of, which matters to us because he matters to us. 
Our reaction to the loss of an object, in contrast, is one-sided. It is our 
loss that we regret. If we think about what we lose in terms of its good-
ness, we stay, in a sense, ‘outside’. If empathy is important for moral 
thought—and it certainly is, just think of the role of developing empa-
thy in moral education—moral thought is not guided by goodness but 
rather by empathic engagement with goodness-for: we have to look at 
the loss ‘from the inside’, so to speak.
This inside/outside metaphor is of crucial importance in under-
standing the goodness-for approach. The following objection will help 
us to get this point into better focus. To say that moral thought needs 
goodness-for is a triviality.5 Everyone agrees. In fact, for the utilitarian 
goodness-for is all we need to build a moral theory. How can Taurek’s 
emphasis on goodness-for have any critical force in the assessment of 
utilitarianism?
5 Kraut (2011) tries to argue for a goodness-for theory but fails to realize that talk about 
well-being is insufficient to establish such a theory. I explain this point in more detail in a 
review of Kraut (2011) in the Oct. 2013 issue of Mind.
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Consider Mill’s ‘proof ’ that general happiness is the highest good. 
Everyone, Mill argues, aspires to happiness. Does this show that gen-
eral happiness is the ‘good to the aggregate of all persons’? If my being 
happy is my good and your being happy is yours, is your happiness also 
my good insofar as I am part of the aggregate of you and me? We hardly 
know each other. So, why speak of an aggregate of you and me which 
has its own highest good? And even if there is, what concern is it for me 
that something is, in this sense, good for us? Mill answers these wor-
ries as follows: ‘when I said that the general happiness is a good to the 
aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being’s hap-
piness is a good to every other human being. . . I merely meant to argue 
that since A’s happiness is a good, B’s a good, C’s a good etc, the sum 
of all these goods must be a good’(Mill, letter 1257, to Henry Jones).
A person’s well-being is morally important—in this the goodness-
for theorist (Taurek) and the goodness theorist (Mill) agree. The dif-
ference between them is not a difference regarding what is important, 
it is a difference about the way something is important. According to 
Mill and according to contemporary welfarists, well-being is important 
because well-being is a good thing. A’s being happy is not only good for 
A; there is more to be said: A’s happiness is good. In calling it ‘good’ we 
put it in a space where aggregation becomes possible. Once its possibil-
ity has been assured, there is hardly a way of escaping it. If one thing 
is really better than something else what reason could we have not to 
bring it about? The feature of goodness which underwrites aggregation 
is that more goodness has to be better than less. If we are guided by this 
claim (as we would be if we saved the bigger number for this reason) 
we are guided from the outside. We are treating people as if they were 
objects; valuable objects, no doubt, but objects nevertheless. Goodness, 
thus understood, hinders moral reflection. When it comes to consid-
ering how things affect a person’s well-being, one has to step ‘inside’ 
via empathic engagement. Once we see the situation from the inside, 
aggregation does not make sense: there is no significant subject, no 
aggregate of all people, for whom it would be better to save the bigger 
number. Neither would it be better ‘for the world’. People are not rare; 
the world is not affected one way or the other.
I have used the metaphor ‘looking at what matters from the inside’ 
to describe Taurek’s point. Thinking about hedonistic utilitarianism, 
the question might arise as to how much more focused could one be on 
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the ‘inside’ if one already restricts one’s attention to a person’s feelings? 
This question shows that what I just argued for has not been absorbed. 
The goodness-for theorist and the goodness theorist do not disagree 
about what matters morally; they disagree about how it matters. The 
inside/outside metaphor tries to capture how things matter. It is not the 
loss of pleasure that counts but the loss of pleasure to the person. Things 
matter exclusively in terms of goodness-for. If we think they matter in 
terms of goodness, we have moved to an outside perspective, indepen-
dently of our views about what matters.
I have tried to support what to some will look like a peculiar and 
uncommon scepticism about goodness with a normative view, namely 
with Taurek’s number scepticism, which also might look peculiar and 
uncommon. If only the peculiar can be mustered in support of the 
peculiar, no one, it seems, needs to worry.
Such an impression would be misleading. I have expressed my sym-
pathy for Taurek’s negative point, i.e. for his polemic against utilitari-
anism, which is an attack on aggregation and, as I tried to explain, 
on moral thinking from the outside. Taurek makes us realize that our 
unease with aggregation is general. It is not restricted to cases like the 
hanging of the innocent. It spreads out to the numbers case, a case 
in which, at least initially, utilitarianism seems at its most plausible. 
Taurek’s critical stance towards aggregation is far from being an iso-
lated curiosity. It taps into strong common-sense commitments and, 
at his time, can be found in Rawls, Nozick, and Nagel who all express 
similar anti-aggregationist views.6
I have linked an anti-utilitarian outlook and its anti-aggregation-
ism with scepticism towards an account of moral thought for which 
6 In The Possibility of Altruism Nagel (1970: 138) writes, ‘The conditions of choice cor-
responding to this [the utilitarian] principle are that the chooser should treat the compet-
ing claims arising from distinct individuals as though they all arose from the interests of a 
single individual, himself. He is to choose on the assumption that all these lives are to be 
amalgamated into one life, his own. But this situation is unimaginable, and in so far as it is 
not, it completely distorts the nature of the competing claims, for it ignores the distinction 
between persons, as we have observed before. To sacrifice one individual life for another, or 
one individual’s happiness for another’s is very different from sacrificing one gratification 
for another within a single life.’ See also Rawls (1971: 27). In their critique of Taurek, both 
Kavka (1979) and Parfit (1978) appeal to aggregation within lives as an argument for aggre-
gation across lives. However, the goodness-for view defended here allows for intrapersonal 
aggregation whilst denying interpersonal aggregation.
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goodness is the central notion. Have I made this connection by perhaps 
naively subscribing to a teleological account of goodness according to 
which the only reasonable response to goodness-facts is promotion? 
Such an account, though supported by consequentialists like Pettit, has 
been questioned by Scanlon. Scanlon (1998: 87) says that ‘the idea that 
to be good is simply “to be promoted” can seem extremely natural, 
even inescapably so’. Looking at the values of friendship and scientific 
curiosity, Scanlon finds, however, that the way we value these things 
is not well captured in its complexity by the simple idea that these are 
things to be promoted.7 When I said that introducing goodness opens 
up the conceptual space for aggregation I was relying on a formal fea-
ture of goodness. I said that the more good there is the better it is. This 
conceptual claim, which does not appeal to any normative notions like 
ought or reason, is hard to deny. If this is right, how does Scanlon stay 
away from aggregation whilst being wedded to the view that ideas of 
the good and of what is of value are important constituents of moral 
thought?
Scanlon (1998: 106) concludes his reflections on value by consider-
ing what is crucial in number cases: the value of human life. ‘Respecting 
the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures 
only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not 
reasonably reject.’ Human life has value in the sense that we should 
treat humans in morally correct ways.
When I introduced Taurek’s utilitarian opponent I had him say that 
life, as we all agree, is valuable. I did not have him say that human life 
is a good thing. Had he said that, he would be committed to saying that 
more lives are better than fewer lives. In its generality, this offends the 
deeply held asymmetry of our attitudes to creation and destruction of 
human life: destruction is forbidden; creation is not obligatory. Life is a 
good thing is, thus, not a plausible starting point. In contrast to ‘good-
ness’, ‘being valuable’ can be read deontically. To be valuable is to be 
such that one ought to value it. Scanlon’s understanding of the value of 
human life is explained in purely deontic terms. It means nothing but 
7 ‘Once one recognizes the variety of things that can be valuable and the variety of rea-
sons that their value calls for, it becomes highly implausible that there could be a systematic 
“theory of value.” Understanding the value of something is not just a matter of knowing 
how valuable it is, but rather a matter of knowing how to value it—knowing what kinds of 
actions and attitudes are called for’ (Scanlon 1998: 99).
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that we ought to treat humans decently. A deontic understanding of 
‘being valuable’ will, however, be available to any moral theory, includ-
ing the goodness-for theory. According to such a theory, goodness-for 
facts are the starting point of moral deliberation. This constrains moral 
thought but does not determine its ultimate form. A complete moral 
theory, construed on the basis of goodness-for facts, will tell us, for 
example, how to behave in number cases. Whatever its recommenda-
tion, we can always mirror these deontic results in evaluative terms. 
If bestness is simply a mirror of oughtness, there can be no objection 
on behalf of the goodness-for theory to calling what one ought to do 
‘the best thing to do’. Thus, Scanlon’s understanding of the value of 
human life is in no way opposed to Taurek’s criticism of the notion 
of goodness. Taurek rejects a substantial notion of simple goodness in 
the sense that goodness-facts would do real work in moral thought. 
Applying such a notion, Taurek tells us, would lead us astray. For a 
goodness-theory, Scanlon saves appearances only. Talk of goodness 
is absorbed into talk of values, and values are understood in deontic 
terms, as demanding a variety of responses. These deontic demands, 
however, are not explained by any evaluative features of whatever it is 
that places them on us.8
So far my main point is a negative one. Reliance on a substantial 
notion of goodness misdirects moral thought. Why? Because introduc-
ing goodness invites aggregation: the more good there is the better it is. 
Unease with the utilitarian view of number cases has been presupposed 
rather than argued for. On the positive side I have claimed that moral 
and political thought as well as evaluative thought in general needs a 
notion of goodness-for. I have not said much about how moral thought 
is supposed to proceed from this starting point. Scanlon’s contractual-
ism provides an example of such a theory. We should treat others in 
accordance with principles no one can reasonably reject. There is no 
appeal to goodness amongst the reasons for rejecting principles and 
we may assume that rejectability of principles depends on how people 
8 Dworkin says that we value human life intrinsically but not incrementally (Dworkin 
1993: 73). This is an accurate reflection of our attitude towards human life. Dworkin, how-
ever, sees our valuing as an indication of life’s intrinsic but non-incremental value. What 
could the axiological basis be for the idea that intrinsic value accumulates in some but not 
in other instances?
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would be affected by these principles. In this way, goodness-for facts are 
the basis from which to construct a moral theory.
My task in this chapter is to defend the view that goodness-for is the 
basic notion and, this illustration aside, I won’t engage with the issue 
of how to build from there. There is, however, one positive point which 
arises from the preceding discussion.
Taurek’s case of whom to save is difficult because goodness-for 
points in different directions. Saving the one is good for the one and 
bad for each of the five. Could the potential rescuer rescue all of them, 
he would. The Pareto Principle spells out this commitment. If one situ-
ation S1 is better for some and worse for no one than another situation 
S2, then S1 is better than S2. The Pareto Principle illustrates how the 
goodness-for theorist sees the relation between goodness and goodness-
for. There is a comparative notion of unqualified overall betterness, but 
its application is explained in terms of goodness-for. You create a better 
situation by making things better for some (and not worse for anyone).9 
Goodness-for has explanatory priority.
Goodness Claims and the Goodness-For Theory
Suppose that, contrary to what I am arguing for, goodness does play a 
central role in moral thought. We’d start moral philosophy with a list 
of things which are good. Here is the list we find in Ross’s The Right 
and the Good (1930: 135–41): virtuous disposition and action, pleasure, 
the apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous and the vicious, 
respectively, and knowledge. I am sceptical about goodness-facts as an 
input to moral theory; I am not sceptical about morality. Thus my the-
sis does not concern a notion of moral goodness as an output of moral 
9 The Pareto Principle in its evaluative form, i.e. as a principle of betterness, is a substan-
tial principle. After all, most people affected might be indifferent to a switch from S1 to S2. 
Just because one person’s situation is improved makes S2 better than S1. Furthermore, it is 
a substantial step to go from the evaluative Pareto Principle to a claim about what ought to 
be done. Although everyone’s situation might be improved by a move from S1 to S2, deontic 
restrictions of e.g. fairness or equality, might oppose a move towards S2. These restric-
tions on the deontic Pareto Principle might also affect its evaluative form as Sen (1979) has 
argued. As goodness-for need not be the only source of what we ought to do—my point is 
that an independent notion of goodness is no such source—my position is compatible with 
accepting Sen’s criticism of the Pareto Principle. With this caveat however, it exemplifies 
how a goodness-for theorist can introduce substantial principles of betterness. The better-
ness captured by Pareto is explained by goodness-for facts. I will suggest another betterness-
principle which shares the same explanatory priority of goodness-for later on.
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theorizing.10 Leaving virtue and justice (the right apportionment of the 
good and the bad to the virtues and the vicious) aside, Ross claims that 
pleasure and knowledge are good. The good-for theorist will under-
stand the central claim made by ‘pleasure is good’ as a generalization 
of goodness-for claims. A’s pleasure is good for A; B’s pleasure is good 
for B, and so on. Thereby common-sense talk about the good things 
in life can be adequately captured. Having friends, a family, and a job 
one likes—these are good things. My having such a job is good for 
me and your having such a job is good for you. Unqualified goodness 
statements are captured within the goodness-for theory as (quasi)gener-
alizations of goodness-for claims. I am not putting this claim forward 
as conceptual analysis. Philosophers like Ross mean more than these 
generalizations. They mean that having a job is good and, if pressed 
to explain what more there is, they’d say that anything good is good 
in virtue of exemplifying a non-relational (and non-natural) property. 
Such a claim, however, is a philosopher’s claim and, absent convincing 
philosophical argument, the goodness-for theorist will not be moved.
The goodness-for theory is not a revisionary linguistic thesis. It 
allows for attributive goodness, it has room for moral goodness, and for 
lists of good things, whereby their goodness is understood as generali-
zations of goodness-for claims.11
The Nature and Normativity of Goodness-For
‘Goodness-for’ signifies a relation, often we can call it the benefitting 
relation. Water is good for plants. Oiling is good for engines. Exercise 
is good for humans. When something is good for a plant, an engine, 
or a human being, then it maintains or furthers the proper functioning 
of the thing in question or it prevents it from malfunctioning, deterio-
rating, or, if it is a living thing, from dying, or from ceasing to exist. 
10 I am not objecting to an evaluative notion of goodness simpliciter (or its comparative) 
which simply mirrors deontic notions.
11 Compare Scanlon (1998: 88), who says, ‘It seems overblown to say that what is impor-
tant about friendship is that it increases the value of the state of the universe in which 
it occurs. But there is nothing odd about saying that it increases the quality of life.’ 
I agree: having friends is good for those who have friends. Do we have to go beyond this 
point? For example, is my having friends not only good for me but good for you as well? As 
long as I function normally and I am no danger to you, it does not matter to you whether 
I have friends or not. We hardly know each other, so I can see no reason why it should mat-
ter to you.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Mon Aug 04 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780198722144.indd   191 8/4/2014   6:11:20 PM
192 Christian Piller
If we understand these examples, we understand the relation I mean. 
There will be Xs and Ys such that we don’t know whether X is good for 
Y. Not knowing whether the relation holds in particular cases doesn’t 
show that we don’t know what the relation is. In many cases we apply 
the concept ‘good-for’ with ease and confidence. In my view, no fur-
ther analysis is needed. If I am wrong and we do need further analysis, 
I would go with Zimmerman (2009: 432). After considering various 
analyses of goodness-for, he endorses his 6(b): ‘X is good for P =df. 
X is to P’s benefit’.12
Talk of benefitting is most appropriate when we consider what is 
good for humans or other living things. (Would we say that I benefit 
my car by having it repaired or serviced? I do what improves its condi-
tion or maintains it in proper working order. It is certainly bad for the 
car not to be properly maintained.) What takes the place of ‘Y’ in ‘X is 
good for Y’ is not restricted to objects. One can do what is good for the 
advancement of science or for the proliferation of one’s religion. If one 
doesn’t take the necessary precaution one might well do what is good 
for the spreading of a disease. Sometimes we are reluctant to talk about 
being good for X when X itself is something harmful. However, ‘A gun 
is good for stopping people running towards you’ is true. Enrolling 
in further education is often good for advancing one’s career. These 
examples show a strong relation between the beneficial and the useful. 
It is no coincidence that when we talk about the beneficial and the 
useful we use good-for constructions in both cases. What is good for 
something (which exists) usually contributes towards its flourishing or 
proper functioning or, simply, towards its continued existence. What is 
good for a purpose (which isn’t yet fully realized) contributes towards 
its coming about. The useful and the beneficial are inter-definable. 
12 I do not mean to deny that the question what is good for a human being is sometimes 
difficult. I doubt, though, that disputes between different accounts of well-being are to be 
solved via an analysis of the being-good-for relation. Darwall (2002: 8) says that ‘what it is 
for something to be good for someone just is for it to be something one should desire for him 
for his own sake’. The question whether good things can happen to someone after death—to 
take one contentious issue—is not made any easier when we rephrase it in accordance with 
Darwall’s suggestion. Can I really want his posthumous fame for his sake? Furthermore, it 
seems that when I desire something for his sake then what I want to happen to him, e.g. 
that he brushes his teeth every evening, is explained by my concern for his well-being. It 
could not be explained, it seems to me, by my concern for what one should want for him 
for his own sake.
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The useful is beneficial for the coming about of what it is useful for. 
The beneficial is useful in contributing to the flourishing/proper func-
tioning/continued existence of what it benefits (or in preventing what 
would have contrary effects).
Debates about the relation between goodness and goodness-for 
are often conducted as debates about the relation between egoism 
(as a goodness-for theory) and utilitarianism (as a goodness theory). 
In such a debate the normativity of goodness-for-the-agent is simply 
assumed and the problem is to combine it with the utilitarian doctrine 
to maximize overall or impersonal goodness. The general account of 
the benefitting relation which I have outlined does not justify such an 
assumption. The variety of things which can be put into the place of ‘X’ 
in the expression ‘being good for X’ shows the absurdity of attributing 
any general normative significance to such claims. The normativity of 
any instance of ‘being good for X’ needs to be earned.
According to the priority thesis, goodness claims need to be explained 
in terms of goodness-for. If such claims—like that pain is bad—are 
normatively significant, their normativity will also be grounded in the 
normativity of goodness-for. Goodness-for claims are not by default 
normatively significant. How do they become normative?
There are at least the following two approaches.13 One is a kind of 
subjectivism we find, for example, in Harry Frankfurt’s work. It tells us 
that we ought to benefit those things we care (or ought to care) about. 
Reasons arise for us because we care about things. We care about our-
selves and so what is good for us becomes normatively significant. We 
love our children and their well-being guides us. If we didn’t care about 
anything nothing would (or could) be important to us.
The most basic and essential question for a person to raise concerning the con-
duct of his life cannot be the normative question of how he should live. That 
question can sensibly be asked only on the basis of a prior answer to the factual 
question of what he cares about. If he cares about nothing, he cannot even 
begin to inquire methodically into how he should live; for his caring about 
nothing entails that there is nothing that can count with him as a reason in 
favor of living in one way rather than in another. (Frankfurt 2004:26)
13 Mark LeBar (2004) argues that there is a third approach which he calls Aristotelian 
constructivism.
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The other approach is a kind of objectivism we find for example in the 
work of Joseph Raz. It tells us that we ought to benefit the good things. 
Our own well-being and that of our children is normatively significant 
because we are good things.
What makes the well-being of people worth pursuing, to the extent that it 
is, what provides reasons for those same people and for others to protect and 
promote it, is that people are valuable in themselves. (Raz 2006: 400)14
Subjectivism is well suited to account for agent-relative concerns. I care 
more about my children than about my neighbour’s and, thus, I have 
more reason to benefit my own children than I have reason to benefit 
my neighbour’s. I don’t think that my children are in themselves ‘more 
valuable’ than my neighbour’s. I would not even know what it would 
mean to think such a thought. My children are more important to me 
than my neighbour’s children. That’s just how it is.
The fact that people ordinarily do not hesitate in their commitments to the 
constitution of their lives, and to the well-being of their children, does not 
derive from any actual considerations by them of reasons; nor does it depend 
even upon the assumption that good reasons could be found. These commit-
ments are innate to us. They are not based upon deliberation. They are not 
responses to any commands of rationality. (Frankfurt 2004:29)
Think about a situation in which I can either benefit myself (by eating a 
can of tuna) or I can benefit my cat (by giving the tuna to the cat). Neither 
of us is starving but we are both hungry. If I care more about myself than 
my cat and we both are able to deal with being hungry equally well, I 
will feed myself rather than my cat. According to subjectivism—what 
one ought to do depends on what one cares about—this is just fine. 
Objectivists will agree for very different reasons. They will say that my cat 
is a good thing but I am even more of a good thing. I am more ‘valuable 
in myself ’ than my cat is in itself. I am a being of more intrinsic value. I 
am considerably better than my cat. Presented in such terms, objectivism 
14 We find the same view in Rosati (2008: 343). She writes:  ‘Whereas the good theo-
rist’s good is intrinsic value, the good-for theorist’s good for, although just as normative, 
is a kind of extrinsic value; the good for gives anyone a reason to act, but the source of the 
“good-for-value” of any item that is good for a person is its relation to a being with value.’
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looks like a piece of nonsense. What could one mean in saying, ‘I am bet-
ter than my cat’? Better in what?
My concern is whether we need goodness as an input to moral 
theory. We have come to the question whether goodness can explain 
when goodness-for is normative. I don’t think it can. In order to give it 
any sense, we need to understand ‘I am better than my cat’ in deontic 
terms, i.e. as ‘I ought to be favoured when the same kind of benefit 
can either come to me or to my cat’. This is the only plausible way 
to understand objectivism. If this is correct, however, than we do not 
need goodness. Objectivism (about the normativity of goodness-for) 
does not make sense unless understood in deontic terms (as what we 
have reason to do). If this is right, objectivism cannot explain why we 
have such reasons by appeal to an independent notion of goodness.
We can call the view I have developed here a mixed theory. It has a 
factual (or objective) and an attitude component. It is a factual ques-
tion whether X is good for Y. If, for example, you simply want radios 
to be turned on, there is a fact of the matter whether this will or won’t 
do you any good.15 You care about yourself and if, let us assume, turn-
ing radios on won’t be good for you, then this desire doesn’t give you 
any reason to turn radios on and it doesn’t give me any reason to help 
you, if I care about you. Suppose you really care about turning radios 
on. Given that you also care about yourself and your caring for turning 
radios on prevents you from engaging in more useful activities, activi-
ties that it would be better for you to engage in, you ought not to care 
about turning radios on. The attitudes which make some goodness-for 
facts normative are one step removed from the desires which objectiv-
ists about well-being rightly think are not reason-providing.16
15 The view offered here combines objectivism about what is good for someone with sub-
jectivism about when and how goodness-for facts become normative. The latter but not the 
former will depend on a person’s reasonable attitudes.
16 Some philosophers have doubted whether the view defended here makes sense at 
all. Hurka (1993:194n.17) writes, ‘Could there be an objective or perfectionist account of 
well-being, which characterizes well-being not in terms of desires, but in terms of develop-
ing human nature? I do not believe there is conceptual room for such an account, for I do 
not believe that well-being has any meaning independent both of particular accounts of 
well-being and of the moral predicate “good”.’ Similarly, Tennenbaum (2010: 228) writes, 
‘In my understanding of the conceptual landscape, [objective list theories of well being] are 
actually theories about what is, in fact, good simpliciter, but theories that claim that what is, 
in fact, good simpliciter, are agent-relative.’
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However, even if I care about someone, my son let’s say, what is good 
for him need not trump what is good for something else. Suppose my 
son is on hunger strike. He wants to end the injustice and this is his last 
resort. Remaining on hunger strike is not good for him; it has serious 
effects on his health. Loving him, I will make (some of) his ends my 
own. I support him in doing what he takes to be most important even 
at the cost of its being bad for him.
Scanlon contrasts friendship with fanship. He writes, ‘According 
to the account of value I am suggesting, to hold that fanship is not 
valuable is just to hold that these reasons (arising from fanship) are 
not good reasons, or at least that a person who gave them great weight 
in shaping his life would be making a mistake’ (Scanlon 1998: 89). 
Is subjectivism able to capture Scanlon’s thought? First, a generally 
negative attitude towards fanship is not justified. There are kinds of 
fanship which enrich one’s life. Any football supporter knows what I 
am talking about. This kind of fanship is more than compatible with 
friendship—it enriches friendships by uniting the friends in a com-
mon sphere. A critical attitude to fanship would be in place if someone 
can only be a fan but never a friend. Being involved in the reciprocity 
of friendship is, given that you have the concerns typical of a human 
being, good for you. The subjectivist will point to this goodness-for 
fact when explaining what is right about Scanlon’s remark.
The Priority of Goodness-for and Buck-Passing
My scepticism about goodness is scepticism about the normative force 
of goodness. Goodness, according to the Priority Thesis defended here, 
D. Regan (2004:  211–12) poses the following dilemma for the goodness-for theorist. 
‘Hence the dilemma: any understanding of “good for” which distinguishes it clearly from 
“good, occurring in the life of” also undercuts the possibility that one individual’s “good 
for” should make a claim on any other individual. In effect, the problem is “What does the 
‘for’ in ‘good for’ mean?”. If “for” means “occurring in the life of”, this gives us an empirical 
relativisation to the agent, but the normativity involved is still the universal normativity 
of “good”. We need some other understanding of the “for” to give us a concept of “good 
for” that is distinct from “good, occurring in the life of”, and independent of “good”. The 
relativisation signaled by the “for” must be a relativisation of the normativity. But that is 
precisely the move that undercuts the possibility of Abel’s “good for” making a claim on 
Cain.’ The view defended here sits firmly on one side of the dilemma. Goodness-for does not 
participate in the normativity of goodness; goodness-for facts are not by themselves norma-
tive. This doesn’t exclude the possibility, however, that, given one’s general concerns, one 
either does or one ought to care about one’s brother.
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has no independent normative force. If it has normative significance it 
will be borrowed from goodness-for facts (which, as I said, will need to 
be made normative).
Buck-passers, like Scanlon, hold that attributions of goodness indi-
cate the presence of features which are normatively significant. To avoid 
double-counting they deny that goodness itself is normative. Goodness 
is degraded from a source to a sign of normativity. On such a view, 
knowing what is good (and what is bad) plays, nevertheless, an impor-
tant role in moral and practical thought. Whether we are looking for 
goodness or for those properties that make things good, we are, in both 
cases, guided by our conception of the good. In the latter case, this guid-
ance function is simply one step removed. Consider the following. ‘Why 
do you go to Agadir?’ ‘It’s good to go there—always nice weather.’ The 
climate is normatively significant because it is a good-making feature 
of going to Agadir. In this way one is guided by goodness even if such 
guidance comes from good-makers, like the pleasant climate.
Thus, buck-passing holds on to a role for goodness which, according 
to the idea that goodness-for is prior, will need to be undermined. The 
purely structural account of buck-passing outlined here is, it seems to 
me, unavoidable. In this sense, no one would deny that guidance by 
goodness is, as I put it, one step removed. One would not deny it even if 
one thought that goodness is a simple non-natural quality. In his essay 
on ‘Intrinsic Value’, G. E. Moore insists that, although intrinsic value is 
determined by intrinsic properties, it is not itself an intrinsic property. 
If this were not so, there would be no reason why the property of good-
ness could not combine with any other properties in whatever varying 
fashion. But, according to Moore, it is a conceptual truth about good-
ness that if it occurs in one setting of descriptive properties it will have 
to occur in any other setting of the same descriptive properties. Unlike 
yellowness, goodness cannot freely attach itself; its applicability is fixed 
by the intrinsic properties of things. Accordingly, even for Moore refer-
ence to good-making properties will be unavoidable. There will always 
be an explanation of why we ought to do what we ought to do which 
goes beyond goodness to good-making properties. This is guaranteed 
by the supervenience of the evaluative.
How does the thesis that goodness-for is normatively prior to good-
ness, compare with the buck-passing account? On the one hand the 
priority view will be a kind of buck-passing approach. But I have tried 
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to show that this won’t capture its essence, as any approach will be a 
buck-passing approach in this sense. On the other hand I illustrated 
buck-passing with an example. You go to Agadir because it’s nice and 
warm there and that, we said, makes it good to go there. I also said that 
this shows how, on the buck-passing account, one would still be guided 
by the good. It is the fact that it is good to go there that plays a crucial 
role in why one should do so. Such explanatory ambition requires a 
more substantial account of the good than would be provided by a 
notion that merely mirrors deontic facts. This is the point at which the 
priority of goodness-for view comes in. It offers some substance to what 
guides one in cases like going to Agadir. According to this view, we are 
not guided by any substantial notion of goodness. Rather you should 
go there because it is good for you. Goodness-for and not goodness 
explains the deontic fact.
2. Defending the Priority of Goodness-For
In the first part of this chapter, I developed a view according to which 
goodness-for is the basic notion in moral thought. We ought to assist 
those who need help because it is good for those assisted; we ought not 
to harm others because doing so would be bad for them. Obviously, 
moral justification on the basis of goodness-for facts can take more 
complex forms; it does so in Scanlon’s contractualism. I supported 
Frankfurt’s subjectivism as an account of why and when (objective) 
goodness-for is normatively relevant for an agent. In this part of the 
chapter I will defend this view against three objections. I will call them 
the semantic, the metaphysical/epistemological, and the normative 
objection.
The Semantic Objection
Plato said that the idea of the good explains the notions of the useful 
and of the beneficial. In this section we understand such priority of the 
good semantically. ‘X is good for Y’ means, according to the semantic 
objection, that X is good and that Y has X. If we needed to appeal to 
goodness simpliciter in order to explain goodness-for claims, goodness-
for could not be the basic notion. Famously, G. E. Moore endorses the 
semantic objection to the priority thesis.
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In what sense can a thing be good for me? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the 
only thing which can belong to me, which can be mine, is something which 
is good, and not the fact that it is good. When, therefore, I talk of anything I 
get as ‘my own good,’ I must mean either that the thing I get is good, or that 
my possessing it is good. In both cases it is only the thing or the possession of 
it which is mine, and not the goodness of that thing or that possession. (Moore 
1903: 99)
Moore offers two options to understand goodness-for claims. ‘X is good 
for Y’ means either ‘X is good and Y has it’, or it means ‘Y’s having X is 
good’. In both cases, goodness simpliciter explains goodness-for. Is this 
a plausible view?
Water is a good thing. On this I agree with Moore. I understand it as 
follows. Water is a good thing because it is good for plants, for animals, 
and for humans alike. Apart from its being good for us, it is unclear 
what its goodness could signify. Not washing your hands is good for 
the spread of bacteria. Washing your hands is good for the people you 
shake hands with. Is washing your hands and not washing them both 
good?
The purpose of Moore’s analysis is to show that egoism is contra-
dictory. The egoist wanted to say that for each of us our own good 
is the highest good for us, i.e. A’s good is the highest good for A, B’s 
good for B, and so on. If his analysis is right, then the qualification 
‘for us’ drops out and becomes a fact about ownership. However, it 
cannot be right that A’s good is the highest good and B’s good as well 
and so on. ‘What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man’s being 
happy is the sole good—that a number of different things are each 
of them the only good thing there is—an absolute contradiction!’ 
(Moore 1903: 99).
Suppose if I  turn to the left I  save A; if I  turn to the right I  save 
B. Neither I, nor anyone else, can save both A and B. My turning to the 
left is good for A, he will be saved, and bad for B, he will suffer harm. 
These are facts we simply have to account for. According to Moore’s 
analysis, my turning to the left seems to be both good and bad. My 
turning to the left is good and it fails to be good—an absolute con-
tradiction. Furthermore, the ownership relation, which is supposed to 
explain the relational character of goodness-for claims, does not seem 
to make sense in this case. It does not make sense to say that my turning 
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to the left is good and A has it. Nor does it make sense to say that A’s 
‘having of my turning left’ would be good.
What would a Moorean response be? Nothing can be good and bad 
in itself—this would indeed be a contradiction. However, there is a 
notion of instrumental goodness, i.e. of being productive of good, and 
things can have various causal consequences; some of which might be 
good in themselves like A’s being saved and others which might be bad 
in themselves like B’s not being saved. Your turning left is intrinsically 
neither good nor bad—it has two consequences, one good one bad. 
Your turning right is instrumentally good for A  and instrumentally 
bad for B.
I don’t think that the intrinsic/instrumental distinction within 
goodness-for has any significance. We can benefit people more or less 
directly. As long as they are benefitted the degree of directness is irrel-
evant. If the benefit is approximately equal, it does not matter whether I 
drive you to school or buy you a bus ticket. Is paying for my child’s ten-
nis lessons providing her with something that is intrinsically or instru-
mentally good for her? I can’t see an issue to which this should matter 
or whether there is a clear distinction to be made. Parfit (2011: 39) says 
that ‘something is intrinsically or in itself good for us if it is one of the 
features of our lives in which our well-being consists. . . something is 
instrumentally good for us if it has effects that are intrinsically good for 
us’. Let me change the example slightly. By turning left I express my 
love for A. Being loved would, I suppose, count as being intrinsically 
good for A on Parfit’s distinction. The problem of avoiding contradic-
tions on a Moorean account remains.
In a competitive context, there is an event E which constitutes 
your winning and constitutes my losing. ‘The prize goes to. . . you’ 
is your winning and my losing. E is good for you and bad for me. I’d 
say that this event E stands in different relations to you and to me: it 
benefits you and fails to benefit me. Where I see two parts (two differ-
ent relations), Moore would say that there is a whole. There is a whole 
of you and me and E which has a good part (a winning) and a bad 
part (a losing). Metaphysically this move seems acceptable. It leads to 
a stalemate. There are two competing descriptions that carve up the 
world differently. Normatively, however, Moore’s move is less plausi-
ble. Either your winning is good, and everyone (including me) would 
have to aim at it, or winning is good, something everyone ought to 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Mon Aug 04 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780198722144.indd   200 8/4/2014   6:11:21 PM
 What is Goodness Good For? 201
aim at and you have managed to achieve. According to this later alter-
native, in aiming at winning we both aim at something good. This 
aim, however, is that a winning takes place, i.e. that someone wins, 
and thus does not describe the aim of someone in a competitive con-
text. I aim at my winning the prize and you aim at your winning 
it. If we both aimed at there being a winning we only had to ensure 
that the prize is handed out which is a very different objective from 
that which we naturally aim at in a competition. It should not be a 
surprise that Moore cannot correctly describe a competitive context. 
If only goodness simpliciter counted, it would not matter ‘where’ the 
good is realized. Moore’s claim that winning is a good thing sounds 
plausible only if we read it as a generalization of goodness-for claims. 
My winning would be good for me and your winning would be good 
for you. 17
The Metaphysical/Epistemological Objection
How do I find out what is good for me? According to the objection we 
are now considering, I can only find out what is good for me by finding 
out what is good simpliciter. The epistemology tracks the metaphys-
ics: only good things can be good for me.
Joseph Raz (1999: 254–5) distinguishes between relational and non-
relational goods in the following way. ‘Let me stipulate that a good is 
relational if and only if it is good solely because it is good for someone. . . 
By contrast I will call a good or a value non-relational if what makes 
it good is (or depends in part on) something other than that it is good 
for someone.’ He argues that there is a relation of reciprocity between 
relational and non-relational goods. On the one hand non-relational 
17 Sergio Tenenbaum has suggested a variation on Moore’s proposal. According to 
Tenenbaum (2010:  217), goodness-for claims are claims about value appearances. Being 
good for Jack is looking good to Jack. ‘ “Good for” marks the things that will seem good 
from the perspective of the agent, and “good” marks what is, in fact, good.’ Tenenbaum uses 
this account to explain the phenomenology of making sacrifices for moral reasons. Although 
we see the sacrifice as morally required and thus good, the fact that it is a sacrifice leads to a 
recalcitrant illusion of goodness on the other side namely when we consider not making the 
sacrifice and act to our own advantage. This account faces two problems. First, what is good 
for me, e.g. eating broccoli or quitting smoking, need not appear good to me. Secondly, it is 
unclear how Tenenbaum’s account handles the conflict cases described. Not only do I know 
that saving A will appear good to A, I also know that it will be good for A. This, however, 
leaves it open whether saving A is morally good. Whether it is or not will depend on how the 
reasons to save A compare with the reasons to save B.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Mon Aug 04 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780198722144.indd   201 8/4/2014   6:11:21 PM
202 Christian Piller
goods are also relational goods. ‘Whatever is good simpliciter is at least 
potentially good for some valuer’ (Raz 1999: 263). From the perspec-
tive of the goodness-for theory this is a concessive move. All values, 
he says (Raz 2004: 274), are personal values: ‘anything which is of 
value can be good for someone’. Raz raises an objection to the prior-
ity of goodness-for because he thinks that relational goods presuppose 
non-relational ones. This dependency is manifest in ‘(a) understanding 
the concept of a relational good requires understanding the notion of 
non-relational goods, (b) there are no relational goods unless there are 
also non-relational goods, and (c) if anything is intrinsically good for a 
valuer. . . then it is also good simpliciter’ (Raz 1999: 263).
Playing the piano, Raz claims, is good for Johnny because it is a 
good thing and Johnny is able to learn and appreciate piano playing.
In other words in justifying that anything is good for any agent we show 
(a) that the thing is good, and (b) that the agent has the ability and opportu-
nity to have the good. I can think of no other way to account for why what is 
intrinsically good for some person or other. . . is good for them.18
Raz is right. When I recommend a book to you, I can say that you’ll 
enjoy it but I can as well recommend it by saying that it is a good book 
or that it is good for you to read this book. I might even add that it is 
good for you to read this book because it is good to read it. Does such 
an explanation show that we need to refer to non-relational goods 
in order to explain the presence of relational goods? I do not think 
18 The same point is made by Darwall (2002: 75). ‘My normative claim will be that the 
best life for human beings is one of significant engagement in activities through which we 
come into appreciative rapport with agent-neutral values, such as aesthetic beauty, knowl-
edge and understanding, and the worth of living beings. An important aspect of a rational 
care meta-ethics of welfare is its thesis that welfare’s normativity is not agent-relative, but 
rather agent-neutral, from the perspective of one caring. But if what is good for someone is 
what it makes sense to want for her for her sake, from the agent-neutral perspective of one 
caring, then it should not be surprising that whether an activity makes a contribution to her 
welfare can partly depend on its relation to agent-neutral values.’ Raz goes on to consider 
what for him is the only alternative, namely to explain what is good for someone in terms of 
what this person desires. This, however, is not a promising line to take. On my understand-
ing of goodness-for it is perfectly possible to want what is or will turn out to be bad for one. 
Hurka’s thinking at this point (see n. 16) is similar. He also focuses on a desire theory as the 
main alternative to his goodness approach.
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that it does and offer the following alternative explanation. This is a 
good book because everyone (like you) will enjoy it. I explain why 
you will enjoy it by showing that you fall under a general claim. This 
explanation is similar to answering the small child’s question ‘Why 
do I have two legs?’ by saying that everyone (normally) has two legs. 
It is an acceptable (deductive) explanation.
As I pointed out when I considered the relation between the 
goodness-for theory and buck-passing, there will be features that 
explain why something will benefit someone. In the book case one 
such feature might be that it keeps you guessing until the end. For 
me this fact explains why you will enjoy reading the book (and thus 
why it will be good for you to do so) on the basis of a more general 
fact, namely that people like you will enjoy books with this feature.
Because non-relational goods are also relational goods, Raz might 
not object to what I have said. However, for him there is a fur-
ther property, goodness simpliciter, which is also explained by the 
relevant feature that it keeps one guessing until the end. I see no 
need for positing the existence of such a property. Furthermore, it 
is hard to understand the nature of this property. A good is non-
relational, Raz told us, ‘if what makes it good is (or depends in part 
on) something other than that it is good for someone’. There will be 
a feature—keeps you guessing until the end—that makes it gener-
ally good for someone like you. I don’t think that on Raz’s view there 
is a different feature that would make it good. If goodness-for has 
the same basis in the book’s features as goodness, I cannot see how 
goodness can be distinct enough from goodness-for for the former 
to explain the latter.
Compare the following case. Why does the tomato stand in the 
looking-red relation to me? We can answer ‘It looks red to you because 
it is red’ as long as we have an independent account of what it is to 
be red, e.g. that tomatoes have the surface reflectance property R. An 
explanation of why a book stands in the benefitting relation to me 
would need to satisfy an analogous constraint. We’d need an independ-
ent account of what goodness is supposed to be (and of what makes it 
good). As long as there is no such account, the deductive explanation I 
offered is the only one which accommodates the fact we started with. 
We explain what is good for you by saying it is good, thereby claiming 
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that you are not special, you fall under the general category of people 
for whom it is good.19
The Normative Objection
Moral theory cannot do without interpersonal comparisons of well-
being. This problem is often restricted to discussion of utilitarianism. 
However, even on Rawls theory we need comparability of welfare levels 
in order to determine which group is the worst-off.20 Richard Arneson 
defends the importance of a concept of goodness (or betterness) simplic-
iter along such lines.
The concept of intrinsic value is not merely a building block in consequen-
tialist theories, and if this concept (or the best revisions we can construct) 
is found wanting, the loss would have wide reverberations. More is at stake 
than the status of consequentialism. I suspect any plausible non-consequen-
tialist morality would include as a component a principle of beneficence. In 
a consequentialist theory some beneficence principle is the sole fundamental 
principle; in a non-consequentialist theory beneficence would be one principle 
amongst others. Whatever its exact contours, a beneficence principle to fill 
its role must rank some states of the world as better or worse, and direct us 
to bring about the better ones within the limits imposed by other principles 
that introduce moral constrains and moral options. We need some commen-
surability, a measureable notion of good. We need the idea of what is good 
simpliciter. (Arneson 2010: 741)
19 The metaphysical/epistemological objection can take other forms as well. For example, 
we are not focused on ourselves but on the relevant features of things when we consider 
where to go or what to do. The goodness-for theory can explain the world-directedness of 
practical deliberation. It will be a feature of wherever we go which makes it good or bad 
for us. Furthermore, goodness-for the agent spells out a concern that seems narrow. This is 
right. In order to get things that are good for us we need other independent concerns. That 
is why we try to develop interest in our children which go beyond a natural interest in their 
own well-being. See Frankfurt’s ‘On the Usefulness of Final Ends’ (Frankfurt 1992) for an 
account of the rational pressure to broaden the realm of what one cares about that is friendly 
to the goodness-for theory developed here.
20 One could try to take an easy route out and postpone any comparability of harms and 
benefits to the endpoint of moral theorizing. Philippa Foot (1985: 206) has taken such a line 
in her ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’, when she writes, ‘It is not that in “the guise of the 
best outcome” [maximum welfare] stands outside morality as its foundation and arbiter, but 
rather that it appears within morality as an end of one of the virtues.’ If we are naturalists 
about goodness-for this line is less attractive.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Mon Aug 04 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780198722144.indd   204 8/4/2014   6:11:21 PM
 What is Goodness Good For? 205
Arneson is right. We need a notion of betterness which allows us to 
make welfare comparisons. Some such comparisons are done with ease 
and confidence. It is better for A to lose his umbrella than for B to lose 
her arm. This is a comparison in terms of betterness simpliciter. The loss 
of A’s umbrella is less bad simpliciter than the loss of B’s arm. Let us 
assume that this is a case of conflicting interests. The relevant goodness-
for evaluations point in different directions. Obviously it is better for B 
not to lose her arm than it is for B if A lost his umbrella. But let us also 
assume that it is better for A that B lost her arm than that he lost his 
umbrella. According to the priority thesis, goodness-for needs to explain 
betterness simpliciter as it did in case of the Pareto Principle.
Note that our example does not involve any aggregation of harms 
and benefits. We do not need to aggregate in order to compare. Why 
do we make the umbrella/arm comparison so easily? Whatever person 
we are thinking of, it would in general be better for this person to lose 
her umbrella than to lose her arm. There is a general truth here: for all 
(normal) people each of their arms is more important to them than any 
of their umbrellas. A commitment to impartiality takes us from this 
truth within all (normal) instances of goodness-for-a-person to a com-
parison across two instances of goodness-for-a-person. Because losses of 
arms are worse for anyone than losses of umbrellas we think it is better 
for one to lose his umbrella than for another to lose her arm. This is a 
substantial moral principle. A crucial role in its explanation, however, 
is played by the general goodness-for fact. This situation parallels the 
explanation of the Pareto Principle. It too is a genuine moral princi-
ple that is not exhausted by goodness-for claims—S1, the situation in 
which everyone is better off, is simply better then S2—but goodness-for 
claims play a central role in explanations of why we accept this princi-
ple. The same holds for interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
Within the goodness-for theory we have found some space for wel-
fare comparisons. John Broome in his Weighing Lives (2004) pursues 
a more ambitious project. He suggests the following solution to the 
problem of interpersonal comparability. (1) How things are for a person 
I shall call her life. (2) Because a life includes everything that can affect 
a person’s well-being, the person who lives a particular life has exactly 
the same well-being as any other person would have if she lived that life. 
(3) The goodness of a life is independent of who lives it. Thus, (4) each 
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person’s individual scale of goodness turns out to be a universal scale, 
measuring the goodness of lives for everyone.
I said we can compare A’s loss with B’s because for any P the former 
loss would be worse for P than the latter loss. Broome’s approach is dif-
ferent. We can compare losses because the goodness we find in a life is 
the same wherever it occurs. This strongly reminds one of Moore’s view. 
Something is good for P if it is good and P has it. Broome denies what is 
central to my understanding of goodness-for, namely that what is good 
for me need not be good for you. The facts that are relevant for a good-
for-A life need not be the same as the facts relevant for a good-for-B life. 
Thus, I deny Broome’s claim that ‘the being who lives a particular life 
has exactly the same well-being as any other being would have if she lived 
that life’. What is good in a frog-life (flies, water, and other frogs) will not 
be good in a human life. I don’t know whether my well-being, if I were 
a frog, would be the same as a frog’s. It depends on what it would mean 
for me to be a frog. Broome’s account can only be plausible if P in good-
for-P is an empty placeholder. But when we say that playing the piano 
would be good for P we are talking about a particular person with par-
ticular abilities and opportunities. If it is true that it is good for P to play 
the piano then, on Broome’s account, I could as well point to a frog and 
say that P’s piano-playing life would be as good for the frog as it is for P.
We have found a similar difference between the goodness-for theory 
and Broome as we did in the case of Moore. Moore saw a whole where 
I saw parts. Broome sees a property where I see relations.
Conclusion
I have argued that goodness-for is ‘the basic notion’ in moral thought 
and I have argued for ‘the priority’ of goodness-for over goodness.21 
Looking back we can distinguish different relations between good-
ness-for and goodness. In the case of attributive goodness, as when we 
talk about a good book or a good car, the relation to our interests is 
21 I have not discussed the Non-Identity Problem. For Parfit (and others) it shows a short-
coming of any goodness-for approach. Our concern for future generations is, in my view, a 
concern for the people who will exist, whoever they are. See Hare (2007) for an answer to 
the Non-Identity Problem along such lines.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Mon Aug 04 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780198722144.indd   206 8/4/2014   6:11:22 PM
 What is Goodness Good For? 207
straightforward. A good book is a book that satisfies the interest people 
usually have when they are interested in books (in respect to this inter-
est). It is no surprise that we evaluate attributively in accordance with 
our (normal) interests. When we use ‘good’ attributively we do not try 
to track any independently given value with our interest. Is pain a bad 
thing? Yes it is, in the sense that A’s pain is bad for A, B’s pain bad for 
B and so on. Is living in a just society, or being virtuous, a good thing? 
Yes it is. Such evaluations, however, are the output of moral theory. I 
made a claim about the input into moral theory. Finally, isn’t it simply 
better if everyone is better off? Yes it is. It is better because it is better 
for everyone.
Putting my view in a slogan, I have argued for an ethics without 
goodness. To some, to the Mooreans, this will seem outrageous. 
I’ve tried to undermine their view. To others it might seem trivial. 
David Enoch (2011) defends what he calls Robust Meta-ethical 
Realism. He is not offended by being called a ‘Platonist’, but, 
when motivating his project, he does not see any need for a dis-
cussion of goodness simpliciter. Douglas Portmore (2012) defends 
consequentialism. For him, as is the case with Enoch, talk about 
reasons has made talk about goodness superf luous. If neither the 
Platonist nor the consequentialist needs goodness anymore, it 
really has gone out of fashion. I am not sure whether I fall on the 
outrageous or on the trivial side. I fall on both if what is outra-
geous to some is trivial to others.22
22 I have received many interesting comments when I have presented parts or earlier ver-
sions of this material. I thank everyone who contributed to these discussions in Montreal, 
Jerusalem, Tucson, Birmingham, Muenster, and York. Furthermore, for comments and 
discussions I thank David Sosa, Sergio Tennenbaum, Richard Kraut, David Enoch, Iwao 
Hirose, Jenny Hawkins, Ruth Weintraub, Ralf Bader, Jussi Suikkanen, James Pryor, Chris 
Belshaw, Thomas Schmidt, Mark LeBar, and Steve Holland.
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